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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
__________
No. 06-3917
__________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.
ROBERT LLOYD BROOKS,
                                                  Appellant.
__________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civil No. 04-cr-00111-1)
District Judge: Honorable Joy Flowers Conti
__________
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
on January 31, 2008
Before: RENDELL and CHAGARES, Circuit Judges,
and POLLAK,* District Judge.
(Filed: March 19, 2008)
__________
OPINION OF THE COURT
__________
__________________
       * Honorable Louis H. Pollak, Senior Judge of the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Pennsylvania, sitting by designation.  
    Prior to this appeal, Brooks did not object to the District Court’s compliance with Rule1
11 during his plea hearing, nor did he move to withdraw his plea.  
2
RENDELL, Circuit Judge.
Appellant Robert L. Brooks (“Brooks”) was charged with one count of possession
of material depicting the sexual exploitation of a minor in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 2252(a)(4)(B).  He pled guilty on August 5, 2005,  and, on August 11, 2006, the District1
Court sentenced Brooks to 27 months’ imprisonment, to be followed by a three-year term
of supervised release.  Brooks was also ordered to pay a special assessment of $100. 
Brooks filed a timely notice of appeal.
Counsel has filed a brief pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967),
requesting permission to withdraw because he is unable to identify any non-frivolous
issues for appeal after a conscientious review of the record.  Brooks was given notice of
his counsel’s intent to withdraw and has not filed a pro se brief in response.  We have
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a).  For the reasons stated
below, we will grant counsel’s motion to withdraw and affirm the District Court’s
judgment of conviction and sentence.
Evaluation of an Anders brief requires a twofold inquiry:  (1) whether counsel has
thoroughly examined the record for appealable issues and has explained why any such
issues are frivolous; and (2) whether an independent review of the record presents any
nonfrivolous issues.  United States v. Youla, 241 F.3d 296, 300 (3d Cir. 2001).  Where the
3Anders brief appears adequate on its face, our review is limited to the portions of the
record identified in the brief, along with any issues raised by an appellant in a pro se
brief.  See id. at 301.  We conclude that the brief in this case is adequate, and thus, it will
guide our independent review of the record.
Pursuant to his obligation under the first prong of our analysis, counsel has
identified several potential, but frivolous, issues.  By entering an unconditional guilty
plea, Brooks waived all claims for appellate relief with the exception of claims that
(1) the court lacked jurisdiction to accept the plea, (2) the plea was invalid under
applicable statutory and constitutional standards, and (3) the sentence is illegal.  See
United States v. Broce, 488 U.S. 563 (1989).  
First, the District Court clearly had jurisdiction to enter a conviction and impose a
sentence for Brooks’s violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(4)(B), a federal crime over which
Congress has granted United States district courts jurisdiction.  See 18 U.S.C. § 3231. 
Although any objection as to improper venue has been waived by Brooks at this point,
venue was indeed proper and is therefore not an appropriate ground for appeal.  
Second, although Brooks’s counsel and the Government have identified several
technical deficiencies in the District Court’s plea colloquy with Brooks, none of the
deficiencies meet the plain error standard that applies to this appeal.  Moreover, as Brooks
has declined to file a pro se brief opposing his counsel’s representations, we can hardly
conclude that he has met his burden of establishing a reasonable probability that he would
4not have entered a guilty plea had the deficiencies been corrected.  See United States v.
Dominguez Benitez, 542 U.S. 74, 83 (2004) (“[A] defendant who seeks reversal of his
conviction after a guilty plea, on the ground that the district court committed plain error
under Rule 11, must show a reasonable probability that, but for the error, he would not
have entered the plea.”).
Finally, as to the lawfulness of Brooks’s sentence, the record is clear that the
District Court carefully analyzed the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) and
ultimately imposed a reasonable sentence at the very bottom of the advisory Guidelines
range.  The only argument raised by Brooks prior to sentencing that the District Court did
not directly address was his contention that federal sentences for child pornography
offenses are much stiffer than those imposed in state court, thereby yielding unwarranted
sentencing disparities.  This argument fails, however, as § 3553(a)(6) focuses on the need
to avoid unwarranted disparities among sentences imposed by federal courts for violations
of federal law, not disparities between state and federal defendants.  See United States v.
Clark, 434 F.3d 684, 687 (4th Cir. 2006) (“The sole concern of section 3553(a)(6) is with
sentencing disparities among federal defendants.” (emphasis in original)); United States
v. Jeremiah, 446 F.3d 805, 808 (8th Cir. 2006) (“Unwarranted sentencing disparities
among federal defendants remains the only consideration under § 3553(a)(6)—both
before and after Booker.”); United States v. Branson, 463 F.3d 1110, 1112 (10th Cir.
2006) (“Adjusting federal sentences to conform to those imposed by the states where the
5offenses occurred would not serve the purposes of § 3553(a)(6), but, rather, would create
disparities within the federal system, which is what § 3553(a)(6) is designed to
discourage.”).
Our independent review of the record yields no other non-frivolous arguments that
could possibly support an appeal and we are satisfied that all the requirements of
Anders have been met.  
Accordingly, we will AFFIRM the judgment of the District Court and, in a
separate order, GRANT counsel’s motion to withdraw.
_____________ 
